On April 30, 2026, the Colorado Court of Appeals issued a published opinion in People v. Evans, Case No. 23CA1597, reversing the district court’s denial of our client’s postconviction claims and remanding the case for further proceedings. The decision is a significant victory not only for Michael Evans, but for criminal defendants across Colorado.
The Case
Michael Evans was convicted of felony murder and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Critically, the jury specifically found that he did not use or possess a deadly weapon during the commission of the offense. The evidence strongly suggested he was not even present at the scene when the victim was shot. Despite this, he received Colorado’s harshest sentence.
Before trial, the prosecution extended a plea offer that would have made Mr. Evans eligible for parole after serving roughly 14 to 15 years. Mr. Evans rejected that offer. At the postconviction hearing, he explained why: his trial lawyer never told him how adult sentencing actually worked. Having served 100 percent of his sentences in prior juvenile cases, Mr. Evans believed he would have to serve every single day of the 27 years offered. He also did not understand that he could be convicted of felony murder under a complicity theory even if he was not the shooter and was not present at the scene. Had he understood either of those things, he testified without hesitation that he would have accepted the offer.
Instead, he went to trial, was convicted of felony murder on a complicity theory, and received a mandatory sentence of life without parole.
How We Litigated the 35(c) Motion
Patrick Mulligan filed a comprehensive Crim. P. 35(c) motion for postconviction relief on Mr. Evans’s behalf, presenting two core ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The first was that trial counsel failed to explain parole eligibility, leaving Mr. Evans with a fundamentally false picture of what accepting the 27-year offer would actually mean for his life. The second was that trial counsel never explained the doctrine of complicity and how it could result in a felony murder conviction even for someone who was not the shooter and was not present at the crime.
Patrick Mulligan developed the factual record carefully. He obtained and analyzed trial counsel’s handwritten notes, which reflected the prosecution’s offer and the defense counteroffer, but contained no reference at all to parole eligibility or earned time. Patrick retained an expert witness with extensive homicide trial experience who testified that the absence of any such reference in counsel’s notes corroborated Mr. Evans’s account and reflected a failure to meet the standard of care.
The district court held a multi-day hearing on the parole eligibility claim but denied it, concluding that because the prosecution had never extended a “firm” plea offer, Mr. Evans could not establish either deficient performance or prejudice. The court denied the complicity claim without any hearing at all. Patrick Mulligan appealed both rulings.
The Appeal and What the Court Decided
The Court of Appeals reversed on both issues.
On the parole eligibility claim, the court held that the district court had applied the wrong legal standard. The absence of a firm offer does not end the analysis. As the court explained, a defendant can establish prejudice by showing a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the prosecution would have extended a firm offer that the defendant would have accepted. The court pointed to compelling evidence supporting that conclusion: the prosecution had offered a 25-year deal to the actual shooter in the case, and Mr. Evans’s expert testified that soft offers typically become firm offers when a client expresses a willingness to accept them.
On the complicity claim, the court held that Mr. Evans was entitled to an evidentiary hearing. His allegations, if proven, would establish that counsel’s failure to explain his exposure under a complicity theory of liability deprived him of the ability to make an informed decision about the plea offer. That is precisely the kind of claim that requires a hearing, not a summary dismissal.
Why This Decision Matters
The Evans opinion brings Colorado squarely in line with a well-developed body of federal precedent on the right to effective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations. Federal circuit courts, including the Sixth, Second, Seventh, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits, had already established that the absence of a formal plea offer does not foreclose an ineffective assistance claim. Colorado courts had not directly addressed the question until now.
The Court’s opinion is significant. Plea negotiations often begin with informal, exploratory discussions before a firm offer ever materializes. If defense counsel provides constitutionally deficient advice at that early stage, a defendant may never have the opportunity to meaningfully participate in the negotiation process at all. The Evans decision recognizes that reality. As the court put it, if soft offers generally precede firm offers, counsel’s advice about the soft offer will often determine whether a firm offer is ever extended. The Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of effective assistance of counsel must extend to the entire plea negotiation process.
For Michael Evans, the fight continues. But after years of unjust imprisonment, he now has the opportunity he always deserved: a fair evaluation of whether his lawyer’s failures cost him a chance at a very different outcome.
Patrick Mulligan’s expertise in both postconviction (Rule 35c) and appellate litigation were on full display in this case. With nearly 4 decades of experience in trial, appellate, and postconviction litigation, Patrick’s work has led to the reversal of dozens of convictions. If someone you know is suffering from an unjust conviction, contact us at 303-295-1500.